Jishuku as a Japanese Way for Anti-COVID-19. Some Basic Reflections
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Jishuku as a Japanese Way for Anti-COVID-19. Some Basic Reflections
Author(s): Wataru Iijima
Source: Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung. Supplement , 2021, No. 33,
Supplement: Epidemics and Pandemics - the Historical Perspective (2021), pp. 284-301
Published by: GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/27087284
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Jishuku as a Japanese Way for Anti-COVID-19.
Some Basic Reflections
Wataru Iijima
Abstract: »Jishuku als japanische Maßnahme gegen COVID-19: einige grundlegende Überlegungen«. It is very important and interesting that the Japanese
government did not mandate an anti-COVID-19 lockdown from 2020 to now.
The main measure against COVID-19 before the vaccination and treatment
pill was the people’s isolation from coronavirus by Jishuku in Japanese. What
is Jishuku? To complete isolation from coronavirus, the Japanese government asked the ordinary people to stay at home by self-restriction. This Japanese way seems to have been very successful during the first wave of COVID19, with the number of infections and deaths by COVID-19 being more moderate than many other countries, including Germany. Why did the ordinary
people stay at home under the government policy? The main motive of
Jishuku was Docho Atsuryoku in Japanese, which sometimes translates to
“peer pressure” in English, but it is not good translation. “A disciplined pressure by collectivism” is better, as it helps to understand Japanese behavior
against COVID-19 during the first wave of 2020. As in many other countries,
the anti-COVID campaign was advanced and organized by scientific
knowledge based on medicine and public health, but the Japanese way had
been highly dependent on the cultural context, collectivism. These situations
have been accumulated in the Japanese history.
Keywords: Jishuku, Docho Atsuryoku, collectivism, COVID-19.
1.
Introduction
On June 4, 2020, after lifting the first state emergency declaration against
COVID-19 in Japan that was went from April 7 to May 25, Taro Aso, the Japanese Finance Minister, said at the finance committee meeting in the Upper
House Diet that Japan’s relatively low mortality rate from COVID-19 reflects
the higher mindo, level of cultural standards, as follows:
I have received phone calls (from overseas) asking “Do you have any drug
that only you guys have?” My answer is the level of cultural standards is different, and then they fall silent. The United States imposed fines on people
Wataru Iijima, Department of History, Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo, Japan;
wiijima@aoyamagakuin.jp.
Historical Social Research Supplement 33 (2021), 284-301 │ published by GESIS
DOI: 10.12759/hsr.suppl.33.2021.284-301
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who broke lockdown rules, and France did so too. But we didn’t have to do
such a thing, and we made it only by requesting that people suspend nonessential businesses and stay at home. We should be very proud of this.1
In the first half of 2020, Japan faced the first COVID-19 wave, but the situation
was moderate than other countries.2 Based on this, Aso said, the level of infection was far below the United States and France. And he continued by saying that it was his impression that the Japanese mindo, the level of cultural
standards, was higher and different from many other countries and played
an important role in controlling COVID-19.
Regarding Aso’s talk, many people, including the Japanese, disagreed. For
example, the opposition party in the Diet heavily criticized him because he
did not consider the feelings of people who died of COVID-19 or their families, regardless of nationalities. Yes, I also agree with this criticism and logic.
But my first impression of the talk by Aso was that he probably touched an
important element in the anti-COVID-19 campaign from the viewpoint of social history of medicine and public health, although his view was nonsensical.
This does not mean that I agree with Aso’s point of view. I suppose that it
might be correct to assume that we need to make a further investigation into
the anti-COVID-19 campaigns from the viewpoint of culture and society,
which decided people’s behavior in every country. The situations of COVID19 in each country were highly dependent on the conditions of medicine and
public health, including the vaccination level. However, the behavior of people played a central role in controlling COVID-19. Vaccination is just as much
a cultural issue as medicine and public health.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine differences in anti-COVID-19
measures based on cultural and social background. The main target is the
case of the first wave of COVID-19 in 2020 Japan. Additionally, I will briefly
examine the situations of China and other East Asian countries for comparative analysis.
2.
Five Waves of COVID-19 in Japan: A General Trend
From 2020 to 2021
After COVID-19 first spread in China, the infection also started in Japan in
January 2020. The first case was confirmed on January 16, and the patient
never stayed in Wuhan, China. In February, the level of infection was still
1
2
“Japan low virus deaths high cultural standard,” The Japan Times (hereafter JT), June 5, 2020.
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/06/05/national/japan-low-virus-deaths-high-cultural-standard-aso/ (Accessed November 29, 2021).
Oscar Boyd, “As world sees surge in virus cases, why is Japan still an outliner?” JT, March 21,
2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/03/21/commentary/japan-commentary/japan-still-coronavirus-outlier/ (Accessed November 29, 2021).
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moderate in Japan; however, the main problem was the cruise ship Diamond
Princess. In the cruise ship, 712 persons were infected with COVID-19 and 14
persons (including one Australian) had died.3
In March, it was clear that the infections had increased in many regions in
Japan. From March 2, a lot of schools, including primary schools, closed very
suddenly at the suggestion of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Because of the urgent response to COVID-19, a lot of people were opposed to these measures
and worried about its effectiveness.4
On March 24, the Japanese government decided to postpone the Tokyo
Olympic and Paralympic Games for one year until the summer of 2021,
frankly saying that the Japanese central and prefectural governments were
not enthusiastic to take measures for anti-COVID-19. After the decision to
postpone the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games, the government, especially the governor of Tokyo, Yuriko Koike, positively advanced the antiCOVID-19 campaign.5 The first wave in Japan occurred from March to May in
2020, but the level of infection was lower than in many European and American countries, including Germany.
The infections in Japan had been more moderate than in other countries;
for example, the number of infections was 1.25 for every 100,000 residents
from March 29 to April 4, a week, but the Japanese government issued the
state emergency declaration on April 7 due to the increase of infections of
COVID-19.
It is very important and interesting that the Japanese government did not
mandate an anti-COVID-19 lockdown from 2020 to now. The main measure
against COVID-19 before the vaccination and treatment pill was the people’s
isolation from coronavirus by Jishuku in Japanese.
What is Jishuku? To complete isolation from coronavirus, the Japanese government asked the ordinary people to stay at home by self-restriction. It is
important to note that Jishuku is very difficult to translate into other languages, including English. I have even asked a couple of English and Chinese
speaking friends who have a close relationship with Japan, Japanese culture,
and language, how they would translate Jishuku to their language, but they
were unable to translate it effectively.
Under Jishuku in Japan, the activities of ordinary people were almost controlled especially during the first state emergency declaration. The infection
rates of COVID-19 decreased mid-2020. What the main reason was to control
the infection is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is exactly correct that
3
4
5
Kosei Roudo Sho (The Japanese Ministry of Health and Labor), The Report for the Diamond Princess, May 1, 2020. https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/10900000/000627363.pdf (Accessed November 29, 2021).
Maddalena Osumi and Enzo Degergorio, “Experts raise doubts that Japan school closures will
curb coronavirus”, JT, March 5, 2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/03/05/national/can-japan-school-closures-curb-coronavirus/ (Accessed November 29, 2021).
Tokyo Shinbun (Tokyo Newspaper), July 25, 2020, morning edition, 4.
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the people’s behavior in Japan played an important role. The ordinary people
in Japan paid close attention to controlling COVID-19, and the outcome was
very successful. But it is also very interesting that the policy of the central
government was not strongly supported.
One of the symbols of the failures by the Japanese government was the distribution of face masks to all people who were staying in Japan during the
first state emergency declaration. The face mask was called “Abe-no-mask”
(a mask by Japanese Prime Minister Abe); it needed a couple of months before it could be distributed, which did not help the everyday life of the ordinary people.
Unfortunately, only two masks were distributed for each family by the
postal network. A mask was washable, but not enough for one family if the
number of family over two, and the cost of the “Abe-no-mask” was also very
expensive. It was correct that there was a mask shortage in the first half of
2020 in Japan, but by the time the “Abe-no-mask” was distributed, there were
plenty of masks in the shops. As a result of this, one-fourth of the masks were
not used and the distribution was stopped on July 31, 2020.6 For these reasons,
the Audit Agency criticized the “Abe-no-mask” as not being effective in controlling COVID-19 in 2021.
Chart 1
COVID-19 New Cases by Week in Seven Countries
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88
USA
Germany
Sweden
France
Brazil
UK
Japan
Note: 3: Feb. 2-8, 2020, 15: Dec. 27, 2020-Jan. 2, 2021, 87: Sep.12-18, 2021
Source: WHO Reports.
6
Tokyo Shinbun (Tokyo Newspaper), July 31, 2020, evening edition, 1.
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Chart 1 is the basic situations of COVID-19 infection in 7 countries including
Japan and Germany. It should be stated that the number of infections in the
first wave in Japan in the first half of 2020 had been lower than those in Brazil,
the US, France, Germany, Sweden, and the UK.
If we see the political situations in the world, the approval rates of many
governments improved as they began to pay more attention to COVID-19 and
implement anti-COVID-19 strategies. Even with the low level of infection, the
central government under Prime Minister Abe was highly criticized. One of
the main reasons was the failure of the “Abe-no-mask,” as was discussed
above. The approval rate of Prime Minister Abe decreased under the spread
of COVID-19.
Prime Minister Abe fell under even more criticism when he asked for
schools to be closed on March 2, which was an unexpected change for families and schools because they did not have time to prepare. A lot of companies
and factories also started working remotely where possible. It was true that
the scale of the impact of restrictions of economic activities for the antiCOVID-19 measures was very large, especially given the fact that a lot of restaurants and bars were closed under the requests of the government. Under
these circumstances, the level of infection decreased until the end of May.
Although the state emergency declaration was effective in controlling
COVID-19, the approval rate of Prime Minister Abe was very low. As a result
of this, the role of Prime Minister was transferred from Abe to Yo shihide
Suga in September 2020. The reason given for Abe’s resignation was his health
condition, but it was clear that COVID-19 was the real reason.
The Japanese government did not elect to enforce a lockdown as was the
case in China and many other countries, including Germany.7 The central and
prefectural governments in Japan asked for ordinary people to stay at home
around the state emergency declaration during the first wave of COVID-19.
To stay at home was not enforced by law and fines. However, a lot of people
supported the government’s measures to stay at home for the personal isolation from coronavirus.
If we make a further investigation into the Japanese way of dealing with the
pandemic from the viewpoint of characteristic anti-COVID-19 measures,8 a
number of issues arise. For instance, a pay-back system, positions of the scientific advisory board, and the prefectural declarations of emergency have
all been controversial issues (Obayashi 2021).
In the first half of 2020, a payback system to closed sectors by the government was not yet started. To recover the economy, Prime Minister Abe initiated the “Go to Campaign” as a stimulation for the travel sector, which
7
8
Karan Deep Singh, et al., “India attempts world's largest lockdown”, The New York Times, International Edition (hereafter NYIE), March 27, 2020, 4.
Kazuto Suzuki, “COVID-19 strategy: The Japan model, The Nations mortality rate is comparatively low despite not having a strict lockdown”, JT, April 29, 2020, 10.
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restricted entry by foreign travelers because of COVID-19, leading to a problematic situation. After the resignation of Abe, Prime Minister Suga also continued a couple of stimulating policy packages, including the “Go to Campaign.”
Finding the balance between anti-COVID-19 measures and the economy
was the most important factor in the policymaking in Japan. Japan faced the
second wave in the summer of 2020, but it was not serious. Prime Minister
Suga continued the policy for economic stimulations, which included the “Go
to Campaign.”
From the end of 2020 to the new year of 2021, the third wave of COVID-19
occurred, and it was more serious than the first and second waves from a
viewpoint of new infections (Table 1). Because the situation was getting
worse, Prime Minister Suga stopped the “Go to Campaign” on December 28,
2020.
In January 2021, the second state emergency declaration was issued under
the third wave of COVID-19. In February 2021, vaccinations began being distributed for the medical and public health sectors; this was expanded to include to the older generations in April. However, due to the delta virus, the
fourth wave began in April 2021.
Under these circumstances, the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games became one of the largest political issues from 2020 to 2021.9 Prime Minister
Suga and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) decided to open the
games in the summer of 2021, which was postponed from 2020. The Tokyo
Olympic Games began on July 23, and the Tokyo Paralympic Game began on
August 24. In both situations, this was very problematic because the seasons
of the games corresponded with the period when there was a lot of infection
cases of COVID-19 in Japan.
The Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games began under the most serious
conditions, the fifth wave, in Japan’s COVID-19 history. The government and
IOC emphasized that no direct connection between the fifth wave and the
games existed. It was correct that the games were managed with the COVID19 pandemic in mind, as both inland and foreign visitors were forbidden to
join. However, from the viewpoint of ordinary people, the supply of medical
and public health facilities had been under the pressure because of the
games. The vaccination for many people was not on time. There were a lot of
infections of COVID-19 in the fifth wave around the summer of 2021. Because
of the shortage of beds for COVID-19 patients, unfortunately, some died in
their homes without medical support. This collapse of the medical infrastructure mirrored the situation seen in other countries.
9
Adam Minter, “COVID-19 is a risk to the Olympics, in 2020 and beyond”, JT, March 3, 2020, https:
//www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/03/03/commentary/japan-commentary/covid-19-riskolympics-2020-beyond/ (Accessed November 29, 2021).
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After the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games, the role of Prime Minister
was once again transferred, this time from Suga to Fumio Kishida in October
2021. The management of anti-COVID-19 measures during the Olympic and
Paralympic Games and the delay of vaccinations were the main reasons for
the resignation of Suga. Under Prime Minister Kishida, the fifth wave was
ended; ever since, the infection rate has been at a very low level (still as of
November 2021), but we did not know why.
How then, the anti-COVID-19 measures in Japan should be understood is
still controversial, because it is still ongoing. But in the decrease of infection
in autumn 2021, a contributing writer to the Japan times wrote, “Mainstream
media has painted a bleak narrative about how Japan has handled the pandemic, but comparative data it has, for the most part, responded much better
than its G7 peers.”10
3.
Background of Jishuku in Japan
The Japanese government selected the “With COVID” policy from 2020 to
now, and the main method was Jishuku, to ask the ordinary people to stay at
home by self-restriction in the period of no vaccination. Why did the Japanese
government select this way, and why did the ordinary people join the antiCOVID-19 measures?11
As was the case in a number of countries, the Japanese government managed anti-COVID-19 measures based on the experiences of avian flu in 2009.
In the prevalence of avian flu, the Health Ministry asked the prefectural governors to close schools and to cancel a lot of music and cultural events for the
control of the spread of influenza. But these measures were advanced only in
limited regions. In 2009, the Japanese government selected a heavy-handed
method of controlling the avian flu: by controlling people’s activities. The
prevalence of avian flu in 2009 was not serious, and, as the result of this, it
was said that the closing of schools was over-intervention12.
It should be mentioned that Japan had not experienced SARS and MERS. In
2002–2003, SARS – which coincidentally also started in China – spread
throughout China and in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other countries including
Canada and the US. MERS had originated in the Middle East and spread to
Korea in 2015. Because of these new infectious diseases, China, Taiwan, and
Korea accumulated rich experiences in how to control infectious diseases. On
the other hand, Japan was very lucky in that it had not experienced SARS and
10
11
12
Edo Naito, “Has Japan's response to COVID-19 been that bad?”, JT, October 2, 2021. https://
www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2021/10/02/commentary/japan-commentary/japan-covid19response/ (Accessed November 29, 2021).
Ben Dooley and Mariko Inoue, “Japan went its way”, NYIE, June 1, 2020, 1-2.
Asahi Shinbun (Newspaper Asahi), April 1, 2010, morning edition, 5.
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MERS in the decades of the 21st century. As a result of this, it is fathomable
to think that the administrative response to the COVID-19 was delayed in Japan.
In the last half of the 20th century, a lot of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis were controlled in Japan. The administrative office for public health
played an important role and the ordinary people in the local regions were
eager to join the anti-infectious disease campaign. After the control of infectious diseases, the main course of death changed to chronic diseases, such as
cancer: this was an epidemiological change based on medical conditions and
nutritious development. The main target of medicine and public health was
changed to chronic disease from infectious disease, and the budget and manpower for public health sectors in the local regions were decreased.
After the avian flu in 2009, the administrative meeting for the infectious disease control, which was organized and discussed by the Ministry of Health
and Labor, discussed how to learn from the experiences of avian flu and how
to prepare for the next pandemic.13 After the Evian flu, two big events occurred in Japan, the first being the political change of the Japanese government from the LDP (The Liberal Democratic Party) to DP (The Democratic
Party in those days). The second big event was an earthquake in east Japan on
March 11, 2011. Based on the political change and this big disaster, the Japanese central and local prefectural governments did not have a motive to make
a close examination on the next pandemic.
In China, Taiwan, and Korea, SARS and MERS were the big lessons that
helped reorganize the medical and public health systems, especially in China
as I will examine later. Under the DP government, the Special Act Anti-newly
Influenza passed in the Diet in April 2012. At this time, opposition parties,
including the LDP, did not vote in the Diets, and the Japanese Communist
Party and Social Democratic Party did not support the act.
In the first period of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Japanese government
planned the measures based on the 2012 law. After then, the LDP revised the
2012 law in March 2020 and managed the anti-COVID-19 measures by the isolation from coronavirus. Under the new act, the Prime Minister of Japan had
the power to ask the prefectural governors to take multiple measures, including school closing and the management of food and medical instruments. Under the new law in March 2020, it was legal for the government to manage
private property.
13
Tokyo Shinbun (Tokyo Newspaper), June 21, 2020, morning edition, 1.
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4.
Jishuku as a Japanese Way for Anti-COVID-19
How did the Japanese government control the people’s mobilization against
COVID-19? The key concept was Jishuku in Japanese. And why did the Japanese ordinary people join the government policy?
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared the first state emergency declaration
on April 7, 2020, based on the act that was revised in March 2020. The target
of the declaration was seven prefectures where there were many cases, and
it was scheduled for one month. On April 16, Prime Minister Abe decided to
expand the target of state emergency declaration to all prefectures. The main
purpose of this expansion was to control the movement of people during the
first week of the public holidays around the end of April and the beginning of
May. Then, the Japanese government decided the pay back 100,000 JPY per
person to all people who were living in Japan, including foreign residents.
The main method of anti-COVID-19 was to control people’s mobilization by
Jishuku, although public transportation, such as railways, subways, and
buses, continued to work as it did in the period before COVID-19. Before the
first state emergency declaration, the rate of infection in Japan was still moderate when compared to that in other countries (e.g., the infection rate was
1.25 for every 100,000 residents from March 29 to April 4). During this period,
Prime Minister Abe asked the ordinary people to decrease their activities by
70-80% based on the scientific research of Hiroshi Nishiura, a professor at
Hokkaido University.
Nishiura was one of the key people to handle anti-COVID-19 measures in
2020 Japan. His major was a mathematical model for infectious diseases, and
he suggested that over 400 thousand people would die if the government did
not control people’s mobilization (Nishiura and Kawabata 2020, 181). It was a
very difficult target to decrease the activity level of ordinary people to 70-80%
because essential work was not able to shift to being remote.
The detail of arrangement under the state emergency declaration in each
prefecture was under the control of the governor. For example, the management in Tokyo was decided by the governor of Tokyo, Yuriko Koike. During
the first wave of COVID-19, Koike asked for the closures of the museums, restaurants, sports gyms, movie theaters, and many other types of commercial
activities, including pachinko-parlors and sex-shops.14
It is still difficult for us to examine the Japanese way in the COVID-19 history because we do not know when/how/why the COVID-19 pandemic will
end. According to E. H. Carr, history is “an unending dialogue between the
present and the past” (Carr 1962, 24). In order to know more about the COVID19 pandemic, we need to know more about it will end.
14
“Tokyo to seek virus tests for nightclub staff”, JT, June 9, 2020, 1.
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Many scholars discussed why the first wave of COVID-19 in Japan ended in
May 2020. Of them, one important figure was Dr. Shigeru Omi, a chief scientist of the advisory board for the Japanese central government from 2020 to
now. He was an MD and had rich experience with the World Health Organization (WHO). Additionally, he had played a key role in the 2009 avian flu.
On September 11, 2020, he joined the academic symposium that was organized by the Institute for Medical Science, which has close connections with
the Ministry of Health and Labor. In this symposium, a couple of politicians,
medical doctors, and government officials discussed the reasons for the end
of the first wave in Japan. Dr. Omi emphasized the effort of ordinary people
and persons in the medical and public health sectors, highlighting his high
level of respect for the Japanese people (Omi 2020, 376).
After the first wave of COVID-19, Yasutoshi Nishimura, Economy Revitalization Minister and Minister in charge of the response to COVID-19, also discussed the reasons as follows:
One idea was that Japan got the infection under control in a democratic and
very liberal manner. Without the government enforcing a lockdown, the
citizens voluntarily cooperated with that effort. In a sense, our herd mentality or peer pressure contributed to building a sense of solidarity. We were
able to do that in a liberal way.15
He frankly discussed how herd mentality, or peer pressure, played a positive
role in the control of COVID-19. From the viewpoint of foreigners, they also
paid close attention to collectivism based on the Japanese cultural context.16
The number of infections and deaths were lower than those present of European countries and the United States, which led Dr. Tedros, the director-general of WHO, to state that Japan should be considered one of the successful
cases.17
Understanding how to examine herd mentality or peer pressure in Jishuku
is very important, but also very difficult. Furthermore, I am worried about
how Jishuku can be correctly translated to English, which parallels previous
work that also struggled with translating Jishuku to French.18 While “peer
pressure” has been suggested, this is not a good translation as it does not describe the real meaning of the word (Kougami and Sato 2020, 54-5).
15
16
17
18
A Special interview with Economy Revitalization Minister Yasutoshi Nishimura, Minister in
charge of the response to COVID-19, The Independent Investigation Commission on the Japanese
Government’s Response to COVID-19, 7.
Paul De Veres Kawaguchi, “COVID-19 versus Japan’s culture of collectivism”, JT, May 22, 2020,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/05/22/commentary/japan-commentary/covid19-versus-japans-culture-collectivism/ (Accessed November 29, 2021).
WHO chief deems Japan's battle against coronavirus a “success”, JT, May 26, 2020, https://
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/05/26/national/who-japanese-success-coronavirus/ (Accesssed November 29, 2021).
Manami Shirokura, “Gengo Mujyun no Jishuku Yosei” (Jishuku, it was a linguistic paradox also
in Japanese), Tokyo Shinbun, June 11, 2020, morning edition, 5.
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“Peer pressure,” Docho Atsuryoku in Japanese, is simply very problematic.
The psychological situation was called Corona Pulitalism by Tamaki Saito, a
professor at Tsu kuba University.19 In this paper, I will propose an English
translation of Docho Atsuryku as “a disciplined pressure by collectivism.”20
Due to the serious conditions of COVID-19 in the first wave, some people
played a role as Jishuku-Keisatsu. It is also very difficult for non-Japanese to
understand. Now I introduce it from a newspaper cutting,
“For our safety, you should close your music live house by the end of state
emergency. If you do not close, I will call the police”, this is the message
that was sent to the music live house on May 2, because the music live house
manages the online delivery, although it is closed.21
An independent scholar, Masanori Tsujita, discussed that Jishku Keisatsu was
one symbol of a very close monitoring society, and it was too cruel. So,
Jishuku-Keisatsu might be translated to as “a para-police by mutual monitoring.”
Jishuku was sometimes translated to voluntary lockdown. It means that ordinary people are eager to join the anti-COVID-19 campaign. But I suppose
that it makes the definition of Jishuku vague due to the Japanese government
having the right to control the activities of ordinary people by an act that was
revised in March 2020. I am fearful that by translating Jishuku as voluntary
lockdown, it is easy to misunderstand that this also includes a governmental
obligation.
5.
The Role of She-qu for Anti-COVID-19 in China
The Chinese government selected a lockdown to eliminate the infection of
COVID-19 after the pandemic in Wuhan and Hubei province from January
2020. It is within reason to say that the Chinese way has been successful because the new infections are quite limited. As a result of this, the Chinese government did not have an alternative way without a “Zero-COVID Policy” from
2020 to 2021. It is very clear, one of the reasons for the “Zero-COVID Policy”
is the Winter Olympic Games in 2022.22
On January 23, 2020, the Chinese government, under the control of the Chinese Communist Party, started the lockdown in Wuhan and Hubei Province.
Because Wuhan was probably the origin of SARS-CoV-2, it makes sense that
it served as the epicenter of COVID-19 in the first months of 2020.
19
20
21
22
Tokyo Shinbun, morning edition, July 9, 2020.
“COVID-19 versus Japan’s culture of collectivism”, JTIE, May 23, 2020, 8.
The Tokyo Shinbun, 2020, May 2, the evening edition, 1.
Yanzhong Huang, “China doesn’t want ‘live with’ Covid, It may have to”, NTIE, September 9,
2021, 12, 14.
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The main purpose of this heavy-handed method is to control the movement
of people from the Wuhan/Hubei provinces to other cities and provinces in
China. Around the Lunar New Year, a lot of Chinese had plans to return to
their homeland, from Wuhan to other cities and from Hubei province to other
provinces. It is also very important that a lot of Chinese had a plan to go
abroad because the Lunar New Year holidays served as a good opportunity to
do so.
The population of Wuhan was over 10 million, and the population of Hubei
province was over 50 million, which is on par with the populations of many
European countries. In the history of medicine and public health, the lockdown at the city level has been very popular, as we have seen numerous
times. However, we have never experienced a lockdown at such a huge level
as Wuhan and Hubei province.
The Chinese government changed the policy for COVID-19 on January 20,
and the municipal government of Wuhan started a lockdown to control people’s mobilization inside Wuhan city and to other districts from Wuhan by the
Circular No.1, January 23, 2020. Why did the Chinese government select such
a hard method? It could be said that the Chinese government selected a hard
response due to the criticism they were receiving from foreign countries and
international societies regarding both the origin of SARS-CoV-2 likely being
Wuhan, China as well as the spread of the virus to other countries being
blamed on Chinese travelers during the season of a Luna New Year.
One of the main reasons why the Chinese government selected such a hard
method, on such a huge scale, was that it was done with the goal of controlling
the spread of COVID-19. After the lockdown, the hope was that the infection
of COVID-19 might be concentrated inside Wuhan city and Hubei province.
The infection to other cities and provinces in China was almost controlled,
which was not as successful in other foreign countries. The case of the Chinese response is not the main topic of this chapter, but it should be noted that
the lockdown in Wuhan and Hubei province should be divided into two cohorts.
The first cohort of lockdown in Wuhan was to control the people’s mobility,
and more restrictive methods were advanced after mid-February. On February 11, the municipal government started a more restrictive method to control the people’s everyday life. By Circular No.12, the ordinary people were
completely forced to stay at home. The gate of every apartment building was
closed and under the control of security persons. If the people wanted to go
out, they needed to have a permit. The supermarkets and drug stores continued to be open under the lockdown, as the municipal government paid close
attention in order to supply food and other everyday commodities.
The activities of people in Wuhan were controlled at the community level:
every gate of the apartment was guarded by the security person. If someone
wanted to go out shopping, their activities were controlled by use of
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permissions. Only a couple of times in a week and just one person was permitted to go outside. The people of Wuhan were strongly under the control of
the community. The community, She-qu in Chinese, played an important role
in controlling people’s activities.23
In Wuhan and other Chinese urban districts, community (She-qu in Chinese) played a key role in the lockdown. The severe inspections for health
conditions were advanced at the health stations in the community by the staff
who had close ties with the local unit of the Chinese Communist Party. A severe curfew was also advanced based on the community and sub-community
(Xiao-qu in Chinese).
This method was started during the anti-SARS movement in 2003. The digitalization of community or personal control by the advanced ITC systems, for
example, the “Health Code,” had been the new key method of controlling the
COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.
The reality in China shows us that community control was the important
reason why the Chinese government succeeded in controlling the spread of
COVID-19. The urban community was reorganized during the period of the
privatization of the state-owned company.
Only a few studies discussed the relation between community and public
health. One of the important topics in Chinese studies and public health studies is how exactly to examine the role of the community in the contemporary
anti-epidemic measures (Shih 2021).
We need to make a further investigation into the reality of lockdown in Wuhan and Hubei provinces. However, it is currently very difficult for foreign
scholars to travel to China, which means that there are currently very few
source materials available. In these circumstances, for example, Wei Bo SNS
has been one of the more important materials, but it is still difficult for us to
examine the situation in detail.
A couple of diaries were already published and available. For example, one
of the most famous is the Wuhan Diary by Fang Fang (Fang Fang 2020). This
diary originally was subscribed to in the Wei Bo SNS system. It is still forbidden to publish this book in China, but we have the chance to read translation
versions in English, Japanese, German, and a couple of other languages.
In her diary, she sometimes criticized the anti-COVID-19 measures made by
the Chinese Communist Party, especially the policies in the first weeks of January 2020. The week of mid-January in 2020 had been one of the most problematic times for the spread and control of COVID-19.24 With regard to the
anti-COVID-19 measures in February, she agreed with the strict policy and
lockdown by the Wuhan municipal government. In her diary, on February
24, she wrote as follows:
23
24
The official government report, to see “Fighting COVID-19: China in Action” http://english.scio.
gov.cn/node_8018767.html (Accessed November 29, 2021).
“China didn't warn of a likely pandemic for six key days”, JT, April 16, 2020, 6.
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But what needs to be said is that the true test of a country’s level of civility
has nothing to do with building the tallest skyscraper or driving the fastest
car, nor does it matter how advanced your weapons system is or how powerful your military might be; it is also not about how advanced your technology is or even your artistic achievements, and it is especially not related
to how lavish your official government meetings are or how splendid your
firework displays are, or even how much rich Chinese tourists you have
buying up different parts of the world. There is one true test, and that is how
you treat the weakest and most vulnerable members of your society. (Fang
Fang 2020, 157-8)
The last sentence, “There is one true test, and that is how you treat the weakest and most vulnerable members of your society” has become quite famous
throughout the world when discussing COVID-19. Sometimes, it is supposed
that she criticized the anti-COVID-19 measures by the Chinese government.
However, when taken together with the text that came before this quoted sentence, it is clear that she emphasized that the Chinese government paid a
great deal of attention to how to care for the elderly generations.
She writes, “As I see it, the government has already agreed to take care of
these people, they will naturally see things through and make sure these elderly patients are not neglected; the people running things, after all, human
too” (Fang Fang 2020, 157).
The Chinese government did not permit her to publish her diary in China,
but a lot of people read her diary on the SNS, where it was originally subscribed and shared. Some people stood on the opposite side with her, but the
Chinese government has admitted to understanding the level on which Fang
was writing.
Wuhan Fengcheng Riji (Diary of the Wuhan Lockdown) is another diary that
described everyday life in the Wuhan lockdown. Her diary was also first subscribed to in the SNS and published in Taiwan (Gu-Cheng 2020). She came to
Wuhan a year ago and worked as a social worker. Under the lockdown in Wuhan, she continued to attend to her activities. After control was seized of the
apartment-gate in mid-February, she often tried to go out with the permission
of the staff of she-qu. It seems like a protest against strict control. From a viewpoint of a common, single young girl, she described in detail the everyday life
in Wuhan under the stay-at-home orders.
With limited sources, including the government reports and newspapers
that were almost subscribed by the internet, a lot of people were staying at
home. Even more important to note is that for many of them, they were receiving almost no financial support from the government. And advanced ICT
and AI systems also played an important role in controlling the mobilization
of the people, including CCTVs that were monitoring people’s activities.
As one of the realities of the lockdown in Wuhan, it should be noted that a
lot of materials including food and medical goods were supplied by the
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government. The strict lockdown was advanced by the economic cooperation
between Wuhan and outside cities and provinces.
It was very important for the Chinese government to be able to control people’s activities, and they did this by selecting a community control by she-qu,
revised para community under the economic reform and response for the
SARS.
A lockdown was advanced in many cities in China during the first half of
2020. However, we should note that the lockdown had been a strict measure,
and that the psychological burden was very high, especially for children.25
During the COVID-19 pandemic in China, discrimination against foreign
residents, especially Africans and black Americans, became more common.26
This ran in line parallel with the discrimination faced by Chinese foreigners
since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic all throughout the world.27
Based on the successful experience of anti-COVID-19 measures, the Chinese way was exported to other foreign countries, especially to African countries.28 Whether or not the Chinese way is actually useful remains to be seen.
Because of the expanded presence of China in medicine and public health,
the COVID-19 pandemic has been a major trigger in changing regime strategies and relationships between China and European countries.29
The situation of Korea should be examined as a highly digitalized society,
called “K-Quarantine,” in the first half of 2020. These systems raised many
concerns over their use of private data, as personal location and credit card
data have been available for use by South Korean investigation for years. In
only a couple of days, data could be gathered on a patient to trace their contacts.30
Taiwan might be an important case in the history of COVID-19. However,
democratic Taiwan and authoritarian China, this is the too dichotomy discourse.31 Additionally, anti-COVID-19 measures in Taiwan, digitalization, and
community quarantine also played very important roles in shaping the
course of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Chinese way of dealing with COVID-19 had been effective in controlling
the spread of the virus, and it was advanced under the totalitarian regime by
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
The case of Shanghai was reported by the correspondence, Tokyo Shinbun, evening edition,
July 14, 2020, 3.
Elizabeth Williamson and Vivian Wang, “Black American in China face rising discrimination”,
NTIE, June 6-7, 2020, 3.
Celine Tien, “I’m Chinese. That doesn’t mean I have the virus”, NYIE, March 3, 2020, 11.
Beijing exports China model if virus response, JTIE, April 14, 2020, 5.
Luke Baker and Robin Emmott, “As China pushes back on coronavirus, Europe wakes to ‘Wolf
Warrior’ diplomacy”, JTIE, May 15, 2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/05/15/asiapacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/china-europe-wolf-warrior/ (Accessed November 29,
2021).
“Smart city” data spurs S. Korea’s virus tracking, JTIE, May 23, 2020, 6.
“How democratic Taiwan outperformed authoritarian China”, JTIE, March 3, 2020, 9. , Kuni
Miyake, Can a dictatorship better control COVID-19? JTIE, March 31, 2020, 1,8.
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the Chinese Communist Party,32 but we should also pay more attention to the
details and the reality of lockdowns such as economic concentration and the
bottom-up approach that came from the she-qu community level.
6.
Conclusion
In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Boris Johnson sent a voice message
on Twitter on March 30, 2020, because Johnson himself had been infected
with COVID-19.33 Based on his experience, his message was as follows:
We are going to do it, we are going to do it together. One thing I think the
coronavirus crisis has already proved is that there is such a thing as society.34
The background of his message was a very famous statement by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, in which she said,
There is no such thing! There are individual men and women and there are
families and no government can do anything except through people and
people look to themselves first.35
Which is correct? During the COVID-19 pandemic from 2020 to now, we have
found that anti-COVID-19 measures were strongly impacted by each cultural
context, and it has been accumulated in the history in every country.
The case of lockdowns in Wuhan and Hubei province were highly supported by the Chinese cultural context and its history. The characteristic organization is the para community, she-qu. The she-qu system developed during the period of de-socialization in China after the 1980s, after the
reconstruction of the social system during the demolition of the people’s
commune in the agricultural regions and the state-owned company after the
1980s. The Chinese government started the reconstruction of the community
and re-organized the social system as she-qu after the SARS outbreak in 2002–
2003.
The community issue in Japan has been controversial in urbanization, especially after WW2. Throughout the wartime regime during WW2, Chonaikai, a local community based on regional connections, played an important
role as the distribution system of food and other basic commodities. Because
32
33
34
35
Tokyo Shinbun, May 10, 2020, morning edition, 5.
Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Japan Economics Newspaper), March 27, 2020. https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO57352250X20C20A3MM8000/ (Accessed November 29, 2021).
COVID-19: UK PM Boris Johnson hails society in latest self-isolation video message PTI, London,
Mar 30, 2020. https://www.deccanherald.com/international/covid-19-uk-pm-boris-johnsonhails-society-in-latest-self-isolation-video-message-819237.html (Accessed November 29,
2021).
Margaret Thatcher, Interview for Woman’s Own (“no such thing as society”), Sep 23, 1987.
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689 (Accessed November 29, 2021).
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Chonai-kai was the core system for military mobilization during the wartime
regime, the Japanese government abolished the community system under
the US occupation after WW2.
From the viewpoint of foreigners, they also paid much attention to community control against COVID-19 in Japan. Paul Kreitman emphasized this possibility to control COVID-19 by community base, stating that it was somewhat
similar to the neighborhood associations in the United States and supposed
30,000 Chonai-kai now continue to operate across the county.36 However, I
have another idea for him. Urbanization and mobilization during the period
of economic growth after WW2 severely decreased personal connections and
community ties, leading to a change in the character of the Chonai-kai. Seeing
as how the distribution of “Abe-no-mask” was managed by the postal network, it was proof that the Japanese society now no longer has community
control.
Because of this, the Japanese government could not select the anti-COVID19 measures on the community level. If the Japanese government selected a
lockdown at the spread of COVID-19, the police might have been be the main
force to control personal activities, similar to what happened in European
countries. The Japanese government did not select this method from 2020 to
now. Because they had no community control, the Japanese government selected Jishuku under the state emergency declaration by a disciplined restriction through collectivism.
In the next COVID-19 waves and the other infectious diseases in near future,
management might be a cultural context that has been accumulated, so
mindo is very important. But mindo should be examined and managed between individualism and collectivism in Japan.
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