Reflection paper on the future of european defence
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REFLECTION PAPER ON THE
FUTURE OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE
EN
1
European Commission
COM(2017) 315 of 7 June 2017
Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat, 200
1040 Bruxelles/Brussels
+32 22991111
2
Jyrki Katainen
Vice-President &
High Representative
of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy
© European Union
© European Union
Federica Mogherini
Vice-President
Jobs, Growth, Investment
and Competitiveness
Foreword
First ambitious steps towards a security and
defence union have been made. The reflection
paper complements the ongoing work on the
defence package endorsed by the European
Council in December 2016, consisting of the
implementation of the EU global strategy in
the areas of security and defence, the European
defence action plan and our cooperation with
NATO. These three building blocks are currently
being translated into very concrete actions:
we are reforming our common security and
defence policy structures, developing civilian and
military capabilities and instruments, deepening
European defence cooperation and enhancing our
partnerships with partner countries and partner
organisations such as the UN and NATO. This being
said, more needs to be done if the Union is to take
greater responsibility for European security.
On 1 March 2017, the European Commission
presented the White Paper on the Future of Europe.
A series of reflection papers covering key topics for
the future of the European Union with 27 Member
States have been published subsequently.
The reflection paper on the future of European
defence is the fourth in this series. It outlines the
main trends and challenges that will shape the
future of our security and defence and on this
basis, sets out options in three different scenarios
for moving towards a security and defence Union.
While not mutually exclusive, these scenarios are
underpinned by different levels of ambition for the
EU in doing things together in security and defence.
The European Union has brought an unprecedented
period of peace to our continent. However, the
rising instability in Europe's neighbourhood as well
as globally and new emerging security threats
stemming from economic, environmental and
technological drivers present important challenges
for our security. Citizens feel increasingly concerned
about security and look to the Union for protection.
If we want to deliver on their expectations, security
and defence must play a more prominent role
in the future of the European project. This was
acknowledged in the Rome Declaration which set
out a vision of a safe and secure Union committed
to strengthening its common security and defence.
Building on this progress, it is time to consider
concrete ambitions with respect to the future
role of the Union in security and defence. This
reflection paper is the contribution of the European
Commission to this debate which will continue
across the 27 Member States.
The stakes for Europe and our citizens are very
high. It is our responsibility to deliver on the peace
promise for the benefit of current and future
generations.
7 June 2017
3
‘In these times of change, and aware of the concerns of
our citizens, we commit to the Rome Agenda, and pledge
to work towards:
[…] a Union ready to take more responsibilities and to
assist in creating a more competitive and integrated
defence industry; a Union committed to strengthening its
common security and defence, also in cooperation and
complementarity with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisa
tion, taking into account national circumstances and legal
commitments […].’
Rome Declaration, 25 March 2017
‘I also believe that we need to work on a stronger Europe
when it comes to security and defence matters. Yes, Eur
ope is chiefly a ‘soft power’. But even the strongest soft
powers cannot make do in the long run without at least
some integrated defence capacities.’
Jean-Claude Juncker
President of the European Commission
Political Guidelines for the European Commission, 15 July 2014
4
Contents
1. Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 6
2. Key trends......................................................................................................................................... 7
3. Europe in 2025 — moving towards a security and defence union............................. 11
4. The way forward.......................................................................................................................... 18
5. Annex................................................................................................................................................ 19
5
maintain more and better defence capabilities.
This can be done through more systematic cooperation
and the joint development of technologies and
capabilities needed to keep Europe safe.
1. Introduction
Rising from the ashes of two world wars that took 80
million lives, our European Union (EU) was inspired
by a vision of lasting peace on the European continent.
More than 60 years on, most Europeans have enjoyed a
peace spanning three generations and seven decades, the
longest period of peace in Europe’s troubled history (see
Figure 1).
One of the major strengths of the EU's approach is
its blend of soft and hard power. It uses security and
defence instruments alongside diplomacy, sanctions,
development cooperation and trade aimed at preventing
conflict. It promotes peace, inclusive growth, human
rights, rule of law, and environmental protection at home
and abroad. While soft power alone may not be enough
in an unstable world, this integrated approach lies at the
heart of sustainable security.
While the world we live in may have changed
profoundly in that time, our commitment to peace
remains unshakeable. Today we enjoy unprecedented
opportunities in our everyday lives, but we are also faced
with new threats and challenges. Peace and security at
home can no longer be taken for granted in a world in
which global and regional powers rearm, terrorists strike
at the heart of cities in Europe and around the world and
cyberattacks escalate.
Our Union also provides a unique platform to coordinate
security and defence policies with core partners such as
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the
United Nations (UN). An unprecedented momentum is
currently drawing the EU and NATO closer together.
Faced with this context, the European Union and its
Member States have a duty and responsibility to protect
citizens and promote European interests and values.
Security has become one of the biggest concerns for
Europeans. They look to their Union for protection.
They demand, deserve and must be able to feel safe and
secure in Europe.
In his 2016 State of the Union address, President Juncker
called for a ‘Europe that protects and defends, at home
and abroad’. This reflection paper considers the issues
that matter for the future of our security and defence. It
does so by looking beyond current debates and decisions.
Instead, it considers underlying structural trends, presents
different scenarios of possible futures for European
security and defence by 2025, and maps our possible
ways forward.
Protecting our societies and freedoms is a joint
responsibility. If we are to deliver on our peace promise
to the next generations in the same way as was done for
us, security and defence must play a more prominent role
in the European project. Our Union is best placed to
provide unique added value when it comes to the future
of European security and defence.
Figure 1: War and peace in European history
War
Many of the threats we face today do not respect national
borders. While Member States remain on the front line
and are responsible for deploying security and armed
forces when needed, these new types of threats are best
prevented and tackled by working together.
1500
That cooperation can be triggered, facilitated and
reinforced by the EU and help make collective action
more effective. The Union can provide the framework
and the incentives for EU countries to develop and
Peace
1700
1800
Source: European Political Strategy Centre
6
1900
2000
as all Member States combined on defence and will
increase its budget by almost 10 % in 2018. China has
increased its budget by 150 % over the past decade,
with a further rise of 7 % expected in 2017, while
Russia invested 5.4 % of its gross domestic product
(GDP) on defence last year (1).
2. Key trends
A number of strategic, political, economic and
technological trends suggest the time is ripe for a
European step change in the security and defence field.
Figure 2: European defence spending in
comparative perspective
STRATEGIC DRIVERS
After decades of peace in Europe, new realities are
emerging within and beyond our borders. To our east,
countries are facing military, economic, political and
energy-security related threats and vulnerabilities.
Across the Mediterranean and parts of sub-Saharan
Africa, the spread of ungoverned spaces and conflict
has left a vacuum for terrorists and criminals to
thrive. Regional rivalries are escalating and we have
witnessed a dramatic rise in civilian victims and
refugees across the world, with more than 60 million
people displaced. Greater connectivity is blurring the
boundaries between internal and external security. And
climate change and resource scarcity, coupled with
demographic growth and state fragility can also drive
conflict and instability around the world.
US
China
1990 1995
Russia
Japan
2000
Saudi Arabia
United Kingdom
2005
2010
2017
EU (28)
EU (27)
2025
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2016 data,
in billion euro), Jane’s, European Political Strategy Centre
At the same time, the transatlantic relationship is
evolving. The onus of improving European security
lies first of all in European hands. The resources
should be there: collectively European countries
are the second largest military spender worldwide.
Together with the United States and others, Europe
has a responsibility for global peace and security.
While acting together with our partners will remain the
EU's norm and preference, we should be able to act
alone when necessary.
POLITICAL DRIVERS
EU leaders have committed to strengthening
European security and defence. And that is what
citizens ask and expect of them. Opinion polls clearly
show security has become the number one concern
for most European citizens (see Figure 3), even if the
reasons for insecurity differ across Member States.
Europeans also agree that collective action between
EU countries is indispensable for their security. Large
majorities in all Member States would like to see ‘more
Europe’ in security and defence (Figure 3). In a space
where goods, services, money and people move freely,
security can neither be compartmentalised nor entirely
guaranteed by Member States acting alone. The
message from Europeans is crystal clear: security and
defence should be an integral part of what our Union
does.
In 2016, national governments stepped up their
response to pressing security threats and the concerns
of their citizens. Defence budgets were increased
accordingly. But the road ahead is still long. Moving
towards Europe’s strategic autonomy requires
spending more on our defences, as well as spending
better and spending together (see Figure 2). The
United States already invests more than twice as much
(1) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Jane’s.
7
Figure 3: Citizens’ concerns and demands
What are we most concerned about?
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
1. Immigration
2. Terrorism
3. Economic situation
4. The state of Member States' public finances
5. Unemployment
6. Crime
7. Rising prices/inflation/cost of living
8. EU's influence in the world
9. Climate change
10. The environment
What do we want?
What do we see?
We agree on a common security
and defence policy among Member States
2002
2008 2011 2012
The EU’s voice counts in the world
2013 2014 2015 2016
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Note: Data are in percentage of EU-total respondents. Respondents were asked to select two issues within a predefined list.
Source: Eurobarometer
In a connected, contested and complex world,
Member States are simply too small to deliver on their
own. Continental-sized powers are far better equipped
than small-to-medium sized states. Economies of scale
matter more than ever to improve effectiveness and
efficiency.
ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DRIVERS
Today, defence markets are highly fragmented, creating
a lack of interoperability and an opportunity cost of
at least €30 billion. Compared to what is spent, the
defence capabilities produced lag woefully behind (see
Figure 4) and there are differences in Member States'
contributions to European defence.
8
This is doubly important as pressure on national
budgets remains high. The tension between fiscal
constraints and competing public policy priorities
will continue to characterise the political economy of
many Member States. At the same time, competition
among global industrial players will rise, calling for a
more efficient use of resources (circular economy).
If Europe is to compete worldwide, it will need to
pool and integrate its best industrial and technological
capabilities.
Figure 4: Duplications in European defence Spending
EU-28
UNITED STATES
€227 bn
€545 bn
1.34
3.3
Defence
Total amount
% of GDP
% of total defence expenditure
Personnel
Equipment
(equipment procurement and R&D)
Other
Operations and maintenance
Investment per soldier
Equipment procurement and R&D
€27 639
€108 322
Duplication of systems in use
Number of types of weapon systems (*)
Examples:
Main battle tanks
Destroyers/frigates
Fighter planes
(*) For selected weapon systems categories
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2016 data), International institute for Strategic Studies (Military Balance 2017), Europe
an Political Strategy Centre, Munich Security Report 2017.
9
Technological change is also dramatically transforming
the nature and face of security and defence. Big data,
cloud technology, as well as unmanned vehicles and
artificial intelligence are revolutionising the defence
sector. They are also increasing the technological
edge of the civilian sector in the field of defence.
However, having such relatively accessible technology
also enables the rapid rise of non-conventional,
transnational and asymmetric threats, such as hybrid,
terrorist, cyber, chemical, biological and radiological
attacks. The surge in internet users has made
cybercrime and terrorist use of the web a new frontier
of 21st century warfare.
Moving forward, effective European security and
defence will rest on efficient coordination of major
research and development investments made by the
EU and its Member States. This will help keep pace
with new trends and generate the technological and
industrial capabilities Europe needs to ensure its
strategic autonomy.
10
and make a real leap forward in contributing to
international peace and security.
3. Europe in 2025 — moving
towards a security and defence
union
Fourth, we need to increase the scope and efficiency
of defence spending. Duplications between Member
States can affect the interoperability of their defence
equipment. It can also lead to a lack of preparation
and readiness of armed forces and gaps in defence
capabilities. To address this, Member States’ defence
spending should be better coordinated. The bulk
of financial resources for defence will continue to
come from national sources. However, an EU budget
reflecting a new ambition in defence, coupled with
a large-scale European defence fund, should enable
Europeans to spend better and improve value for
money. The European Council might consider how
the current limitations to the common financing
of EU military aspects can be overcome when
progressing towards a common defence.
Security threats are not far from our borders
and citizens. Political leaders have already started
responding to such trends. A set of initiatives are
underway to implement the global strategy in the field
of security and defence, to develop stronger relations
between the EU and NATO and to enable Member
States to engage in defence research and develop
defence capabilities together.
The foundations of a European security and defence
union are gradually being built. Only by advancing
firmly along this path will our citizens feel and be safe.
Achieving this will require progress in a number of areas.
Figure 5: EU members and NATO members (2017)
First, having stronger and more sovereign Member
States in a globalised world requires having more
cooperation within the European Union, including
on defence. This will fully respect each country's
constitutional rights and responsibilities. In fact,
systematic defence cooperation and gradual
integration will contribute to the preservation of their
national sovereignty.
EU and NATO members
EU members
Second, there have historically been differences in
threat perceptions and strategic cultures. The nature
of threats has also changed over time. We now
face hybrid and transnational threats, as well as the
significant impact of conflicts in surrounding regions.
A security and defence union should encourage a
stronger alignment of strategic cultures, as well as a
common understanding of threats and appropriate
responses. It will require joint decision-making
and action, as well as greater financial solidarity at
European level.
Third, the nature of the transatlantic relationship is
evolving. More than ever, Europeans need to take
greater responsibility for their own security. As is
currently the case, the EU and NATO will continue
to coordinate their actions on both hard and soft
security. In parallel, the EU will provide the framework
within which the 27 Member States after Brexit — 21
of which are NATO allies (see Figure 5) — would
collectively strengthen their defence and address
existing shortfalls. This would allow the EU27 to
take charge of their own security to a greater extent
Source: European Political Strategy Centre
Finally, systematic defence cooperation and integration
in turn requires a true single market for defence. This
means encouraging industrial competition, crossborder access of smaller industries in the supply
chain, specialisation, economies of scale for suppliers,
optimised production capacity, lower production
costs and security of supply. A single market for
11
defence would also facilitate critical research and
the emergence of start-ups to develop the key
technologies Europe needs to address its security
challenges. But there will also be transition costs and
legitimate concerns to address through appropriate
measures and ensuring the protection of national
security interests.
Larger-scale and more complex operations would be
spearheaded by the most capable Member States. In
each case, the Union’s strategic margin of manoeuvre
would depend on the level of agreement between
Member States.
The EU would complement the efforts of individual
Member States and of our core partners. In
particular, cooperation with NATO would continue
to intensify in areas such as hybrid threats, cyber and
maritime security, where effective responses require a
combination of hard and soft power. However, where
both the EU and NATO are present, NATO would
continue to rely on the deeper military capabilities at
its disposal, whereas the EU would exploit its broader
toolbox and link up its ‘softer’ tools, instruments and
actions to its targeted military missions and operations.
Depending on the political will of Member States to
make progress on these issues, three scenarios can be
envisaged as we look forward to 2025.
The scenarios are all incremental steps in the same
direction. They all take into account the different
trends and strategic drivers listed above. The building
blocks in the different scenarios are neither exhaustive
nor mutually exclusive. They rather highlight different
elements of different levels of ambition for the
security and defence union, in terms of solidarity,
operations, capabilities, industry and use of financial
resources. The scenarios illustrate the extent to which
the EU's potential added value can be unlocked
depending on the appetite of Member States. Some of
the elements mentioned in the scenarios are currently
already examined or implemented. The three scenarios
are illustrative in nature and do not prejudge the final
legal and political position of the Commission.
Responses to non-conventional threats that straddle
the internal-external policy divide such as terrorism,
hybrid or cyber, would remain largely national but
would become more effective through greater support
at EU level. The European Union would facilitate
more information sharing to improve awareness and
enhance the resilience of Member States. National
security and intelligence services would exchange
information more systematically to help better, and
collectively, understand external threats. Member
States would increase their exchange of information
on cyber-threats and attacks, allowing them to develop
more effective national strategies, capabilities and
responses. The Union would also contribute directly
to enhancing the resilience of critical infrastructures,
supply chains, and societies, in areas such as energy
and space. The European Border and Coast Guard
would help monitor and protect the EU's external
borders.
(a) Security and defence cooperation
In this scenario, the EU27 Member States would
cooperate on security and defence more frequently
than in the past.
Such cooperation would remain largely voluntary, and
would depend on ad hoc decisions as and when a new
threat or crisis emerges. While an increasingly complex
and unstable world would warrant greater cooperation
than in previous decades, Member States would not
be bound — politically or legally — by a common
direction of travel in security and defence. Solidarity
would be interpreted and expressed on a case-by-case
basis by each Member State.
Defence cooperation would remain a political goal.
There would be more collective work, notably on the
development of select critical technologies or on the
logistical enablers of military operations. An increase
in cooperation would be driven mostly from the
bottom up by the economic and technological drivers
discussed above. It would also result from an effort to
increase the transparency of Member States’ defence
planning, the creation of an EU defence research
programme and the establishment of the European
defence fund to develop new capabilities together.
These initiatives would promote Europe’s strategic
autonomy in critical technologies and would mark an
increase in the value for money of defence spending.
The European Union would continue to be able to
deploy civilian missions and relatively small-scale
military missions and operations aimed at crisis
management. It would mainly engage in capacitybuilding missions to strengthen and reform the
security and defence apparatuses of partner countries,
reinforcing the EU’s own resilience in the process.
12
However, Europe’s defence industry would remain
fragmented. The bulk of defence capabilities,
particularly complex platforms, would continue to be
developed and procured on a national basis. The slight
increase in defence spending by Member States would
generally not be spent collaboratively. As a result,
very few — if any — EU countries would retain full
spectrum armed forces. EU security and defence
actions would continue to rely on voluntary national
contributions, leading to insufficient cooperation in
critical areas such as high-end capabilities. This would
limit the EU’s ability to engage in the most demanding
missions.
fight against terrorism and hybrid threats. EU capacitybuilding missions — civilian and military — would be
scaled up, helping to make countries in surrounding
regions and further afield more resilient. This would
be facilitated by more effective and robust crisismanagement structures. It would also need a greater
willingness from Member States with the strongest
armed forces to execute demanding crisis-management
missions and operations together on behalf of
the Union in line with Article 44 of the Treaty on
European Union. Greater ability to act would be
matched by the political will to do so. Decision-making
would become quicker and would match the speed of
the rapidly changing strategic context. The EU would
ultimately become a stronger and more responsive
security provider, with the strategic autonomy to act
alone or alongside its core partners.
(b) Shared security and defence
In this scenario, the EU would be more directly
engaged in the protection of Member States and
citizens in case of significant attacks or disruption
against a country and/or its critical infrastructures.
The EU would enable cooperation between Member
States on systematic reporting on cyberattacks. It
would help increase resilience, step up cyber exercises
and include a defence dimension to them. Stronger
cooperation and effective prosecution would increase
the ability to find and punish criminals, thus providing
a stronger deterrent against cyberattacks. Member
States’ intelligence (threat analysis and assessments)
would be systematically shared and merged, and the
Union would maintain a strong focus on the fight
against terrorist financing, organised crime and
money laundering. A further-strengthened European
Border and Coast Guard, utilised to its maximum
would monitor and protect the EU’s external
borders, working in synergy with defence forces.
The Union would also step up its work to diversify
energy sources, develop and promote energy safety
standards, coordinate preparedness for health threats,
and improve customs risk management. Finally, the
Union would further develop its space programmes,
providing additional services for security and
defence, including border and maritime surveillance,
search and rescue functions, or secure government
communication. The scope of the surveillance and
tracking support framework could be extended to
address cyber-threats or other threats to satellites or
ground infrastructures.
In this scenario, the EU27 Member States would move
towards shared security and defence. They would
show far greater financial and operational solidarity in
the field of defence, building on a broader and deeper
understanding of respective threat perceptions and
convergence of strategic cultures.
As a result, the EU would enhance its ability to project
military power and to engage fully in external crisis
management and in building partners’ security and
defence capacities. It would also improve its ability to
protect Europe in areas straddling the internal-external
divide such as counterterrorism, countering of hybrid
and cyber-threats, border control and maritime and
energy security.
The EU’s cooperation with NATO would further
increase. The EU and NATO would systematically
cooperate and coordinate in mobilising the full range
of their respective tools and instruments. Externally,
the EU and NATO would enhance coordination
of their crisis management and capacity-building
actions, for instance through coordinated surveillance
operations, interventions against terrorist groups, or
maritime security and border protection missions. At
the point where internal and external security meet,
the EU would take more decisive action in dealing
with threats and challenges falling below the threshold
of the collective defence clause of the Washington
Treaty.
On crisis management, the EU would significantly
step up its ability to project military force externally,
enabling it to conduct high intensity operations in the
13
On defence, cooperation between Member States
would become the norm rather than the exception.
National defence planning would become far more
aligned, facilitating Member States’ cooperation on
the acquisition and maintenance of capabilities, thus
improving interoperability. Duplication between
Member States would be drastically reduced. The
development and procurement of complex platforms
would be run cooperatively. Spearheaded by an
ambitious European defence fund, Member States
would develop multinational capabilities in several
fields more systematically, including in strategic
transport, remotely piloted aircraft systems, maritime
surveillance and satellite communications, as well as
offensive capabilities. These multinational capabilities
would be supported by joint planning and command
structures at EU-level, as well as logistics. Specifically,
standby multinational force components as well as
a medical and an EU-wide air-transport command
would provide effective support to EU missions
and operations, while a shared European military
culture would be fostered through joint education,
training and large-scale exercises. In addition, critical
technologies would be developed through European
programmes, notably in the field of artificial
intelligence, biotechnology and supercomputing.
A European observatory could be set up to screen
foreign direct investment in these critical technologies
and analyse their potential impact. Europeans would
become more capable through interoperable land, air,
space and maritime defence capabilities. Furthermore,
there would be a more rational use of resources thanks
to the economies of scale reaped by a consolidated
defence industry operating in an EU-wide defence
equipment market and favourable financing conditions
across the supply chain towards small and mediumsized enterprises.
norm, building on the full exploitation of Article 42
of the Treaty on European Union which includes the
progressive framing of a common Union defence
policy, leading to common defence.
In full respect of the obligations of Member States
which see their common defence realised in NATO,
the protection of Europe would become a mutually
reinforcing responsibility of the EU and NATO.
Complementing NATO, Europe's common security
and defence would enhance Europe's resilience and
protect against different forms of aggression against
the Union, as well as provide reassurance that our
citizens expect.
The EU would be able to run high-end operations to
better protect Europe, potentially including operations
against terrorist groups, naval operations in hostile
environments or cyber-defence actions.
Security threats would be systematically monitored
and assessed jointly, in close cooperation with national
security and intelligence services. Contingency
planning would be carried out at European level,
bringing internal and external security closer together.
The interconnection of national security interests
would lead to genuine European security interests.
The increased ability to act at EU level would be
underpinned by a greater level of integration of
Member States’ defence forces, further strengthening
solidarity among Member States. Such forces would
be pre-positioned and be made permanently available
for rapid deployment on behalf of the Union. They
would engage in regular joint military exercises, and
receive regular training in European defence colleges
to facilitate the convergence of strategic cultures.
Internally, the EU would enhance its resilience and
that of its Member States through sectoral policies in
areas such as cybersecurity, the protection of critical
infrastructure, or countering violent extremism. On
cybersecurity, the EU would coordinate response
scenarios and action in the event of cyberattacks or
external interference in Member States' democratic
processes, through for example, systematic
information sharing, technological cooperation and
joint doctrines. The European Border and Coast
Guard would rely on standing European maritime
forces and on European intelligence assets such
as remotely piloted aircraft systems or satellites. A
European civil-protection force would be established
to rapidly react to natural or man-made disasters.
(c) Common defence and security
In this scenario, Member States would deepen
cooperation and integration further towards a
common defence and security. Such a security and
defence union would be premised on the global
strategic, economic and technological drivers, as
well as a political push from European citizens for
common European security and defence.
Solidarity and mutual assistance between Member
States in security and defence would become the
14
Fixed arrangements among Member States would
allow rapid movement of military equipment across
Europe.
up significantly in areas such as transport aircraft,
helicopters, reconnaissance assets or chemical,
biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) defence
capabilities. All this would be underpinned by a
genuine European defence market, with a European
mechanism to monitor and protect key strategic
activities from hostile external takeovers. A dedicated
European defence research agency would support
forward-looking defence innovation and help translate
it into the military capabilities of tomorrow. Cuttingedge knowledge would be pooled, enabling critical
research and start-ups to develop key technologies to
address Europe’s security challenges. Efficient defence
spending and more and better defence outputs would
be achieved through the right mix of competition and
consolidation, specialisation, economies of scale, the
sharing of expensive military assets and technological
innovation aimed at getting the best value for money
spent.
Member States’ defence planning would become fully
synchronised, and national priorities for capability
development would account for agreed European
priorities. Such capabilities would subsequently be
developed on the basis of close cooperation, even
integration or specialisation.
Capabilities in areas such as space, air and maritime
surveillance, communication, strategic airlift and
cyber would be commonly procured by Member
States with the support of the European defence
fund to ensure immediate responses. Europe would
be able to deploy detection and offensive cybercapabilities. Collaborative multinational development
and procurement programmes would be scaled
15
Scenario (a) Security and
defence cooperation
Scenario (b) Shared security
and defence
Scenario (c) Common defence and security
Principles
Actions
Capabilities
Efficiency
The EU complements
Member State efforts,
solidarity remains ad
hoc and interpreted
individually by
Member States
Capacity-building
missions, small
crisis-management
operations, greater
exchange of intel,
EU support to
Member State
resilience. EU-NATO
cooperation continues
as it is now.
Capacity-building
missions, small
crisis-management
operations, greater
exchange of intel,
EU support to
Member State
resilience. EU-NATO
cooperation continues
as it is now.
Initial economies of
scale.
EU supplements
Member State efforts,
operational and
financial solidarity
between Member
States becomes the
norm.
Crisis management,
capacity-building
& protection at
internal-external
nexus. Member
States monitor/assist
each other on cyber
issues and share intel,
European Border and
Coast Guards protect
external borders.
EU-NATO coordinate
on full spectrum of
hard/soft security
areas.
Joint financing of
key capabilities
and joint purchase
of multinational
capabilities supported
by the European
defence fund;
common planning and
development of value
chains.
Considerable
economies of scale
in defence market
at European scale,
favourable financing
conditions across the
defence supply chain.
Solidarity and mutual
assistance, common
defence as set out in
the Treaty.
Demanding executive
EU-led operations;
joint monitoring/
assessment of
threats and
contingency planning.
EU level cybersecurity;
European Border
and Coast Guards
protect on standing
maritime forces and
European intelligence
assets such as drones/
satellites; European
civil-protection force.
Complementing
NATO, Europe's
common security
and defence would
enhance Europe's
resilience and protect
against different forms
of aggression against
the Union.
Common financing
and procurement of
capabilities supported
by the EU budget.
Technological
independence.
Efficient defence
spending through
more economies of
scale, specialisation,
sharing of expensive
military assets
and technological
innovation aimed
at reducing defence
costs, and becoming
better equipped to
face international
competition.
16
Figure 6: The Elements of a European security and defence union
Scenarios
Common defence
and security
Solidarity
Missions
Solidarity
and mutual
assistance
(underpinned
operationally)
Shared security
and defence
Solidarity
(financial
and operational)
High intensity
operations (naval,
air, land)
Security and defence
cooperation
Ad hoc
solidarity
Enhanced
resilience,
high-end
operations
Crisis management,
capability building
Intelligence
Forces
Systematic
and common
assessment of
threats
and contingency
planning
Systematic intel
ligence sharing
Ad hoc threat
analysis
Interoperable
armed forces
Support
to a few critical
technological
areas
Greater level of
integration of
defence forces
Collaborative
procurement
European programmes
to develop cutting-edge
technologies
Critical technologies
Standing mul
tinational force
components
Joint purchase
of multinational
capabilities
Common
financing and
procurement of
capabilities
European defence
research agency
Source: European Political Strategy Centre
17
Capabilities
4. The way forward
Enhancing European security is a must. Member
States will be in the driving seat. They will define and
implement the European level of ambition, with the
support of EU institutions. The initiatives currently
under way indicate clearly that Member States and EU
institutions have already embarked upon this road. But
how quick do Member States want to build a genuine
European security and defence union? To which
extent are they willing to anticipate rather than to react
to the strategic context? How far do they consider that
the European security is a European responsibility?
Old caveats are known and need to be overcome. The
future of the European Union as a peace project for
generations to come now rests also on the foundation
of a security and defence union: looking at 2025,
Member States will decide the path and speed they
want to go to protect our citizens.
18
5. Annex
19
ANNEX
Treaty on European Union
Provisions on the common security and defence policy
Article 42
1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy.
It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may
use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international
security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall
be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.
2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence
policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It
shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their
respective constitutional requirements.
The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the security
and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which
see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic
Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.
3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of
the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member
States which together establish multinational forces may also make them available to the common security and
defence policy.
Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. The Agency in the field of
defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to as ‘the European
Defence Agency’) shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements,
shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the
industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and
armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.
4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as
referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The
High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the
Commission where appropriate.
5. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States
in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests. The execution of such a task shall be governed by
Article 44.
6. Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding
commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent
structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article 46. It shall
not affect the provisions of Article 43.
7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have
towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of
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the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of
certain Member States.
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective
defence and the forum for its implementation.
Article 43
1. The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means,
shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks,
conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by
supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.
2. The Council shall adopt decisions relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, defining their objectives and
scope and the general conditions for their implementation. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant contact with the
Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks.
Article 44
1. Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, the Council may entrust the
implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for
such a task. Those Member States, in association with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task.
2. Member States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed of its progress on their
own initiative or at the request of another Member State. Those States shall inform the Council immediately
should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and
conditions determined for the task in the decisions referred to in paragraph 1. In such cases, the Council shall
adopt the necessary decisions.
Article 45
1. The European Defence Agency referred to in Article 42(3), subject to the authority of the Council, shall have
as its task to:
(a) contribute to identifying the Member States' military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the
capability commitments given by the Member States;
(b) promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods;
(c) propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure coordination of
the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes;
(d) support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of
technical solutions meeting future operational needs;
21
(e) contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial
and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure.
2. The European Defence Agency shall be open to all Member States wishing to be part of it. The Council,
acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt a decision defining the Agency's statute, seat and operational rules. That
decision should take account of the level of effective participation in the Agency's activities. Specific groups shall
be set up within the Agency bringing together Member States engaged in joint projects. The Agency shall carry
out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary.
Article 46
1. Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article
42(6), which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the Protocol on
permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative of
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
2. Within three months following the notification referred to in paragraph 1 the Council shall adopt a decision
establishing permanent structured cooperation and determining the list of participating Member States. The
Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative.
3. Any Member State which, at a later stage, wishes to participate in the permanent structured cooperation shall
notify its intention to the Council and to the High Representative.
The Council shall adopt a decision confirming the participation of the Member State concerned which fulfils
the criteria and makes the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured
cooperation. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative. Only
members of the Council representing the participating Member States shall take part in the vote.
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union.
4. If a participating Member State no longer fulfils the criteria or is no longer able to meet the commitments
referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, the Council may adopt a
decision suspending the participation of the Member State concerned.
The Council shall act by a qualified majority. Only members of the Council representing the participating
Member States, with the exception of the Member State in question, shall take part in the vote.
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union.
5. Any participating Member State which wishes to withdraw from permanent structured cooperation shall notify
its intention to the Council, which shall take note that the Member State in question has ceased to participate.
6. The decisions and recommendations of the Council within the framework of permanent structured
cooperation, other than those provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5, shall be adopted by unanimity. For the purposes
of this paragraph, unanimity shall be constituted by the votes of the representatives of the participating Member
States only.
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NA-02-17-407-EN-N
ISBN 978-92-79-68198-1
doi:10.2775/029216